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NOTES
ARBITRABILITY OF CLAIMS ARISING UNDER
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1934
In his concurring opinion in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,'
Justice White raised an issue that was not before the Supreme Court-
whether an implied claim under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
Exchange Act)2 must be arbitrated pursuant to a predispute agreement
to arbitrate. Federal courts of appeals had uniformly held Exchange Act
claims to be nonarbitrable, based on the Court's holding in Wilko v.
Swan 3 that claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities
Act)4 are nonarbitrable. Justice White's concurrence questioned whether
Exchange Act claims should be protected against arbitration in a similar
fashion. 5
Relying on Justice White's concurrence, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 6 and a number of federal district courts7
1. 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
3. 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
5. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1244 (White, J., concurring).
6. Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393, 1399 (8th Cir.
1986).
7. Bob Ladd, Inc. v. Adcock, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,514,
at 93,104 (E.D. Ark. 1986); Fisher v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 635 F. Supp. 234, 236-37 (D. Md.
1986); Schriner v. Bear Steams & Co., 635 F. Supp. 373, 375-76 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Shotto v. Laub,
632 F. Supp. 516, 524-26 (D. Md. 1986); Gerhardstein v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., [1985-
1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,512, at 93,099 (N.D. Ohio 1986); Jope v. Bear
Steams & Co., 632 F. Supp. 140, 143-44 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Brener v. Becker Paribas, Inc., 628 F.
Supp. 442, 447-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Sacks v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 377, 378-79
(C.D. Cal. 1985); Frye v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. 1 92,516, at 93,109-10 (N.D. Tex. 1985); Prawer v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 627 F. Supp.
642, 646 (D. Mass. 1985); Moncrieff v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 623 F. Supp.
1005, 1008 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Finkle & Ross v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1505, 1509
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Peele v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 620 F. Supp. 61, 63 (W.D. Mo. 1985); McMahon
v. Shearson/American Express, 618 F. Supp. 384, 387-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd, 788 F.2d 94 (2d
Cir. 1986); West v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 92,327, at 92,172 (W.D. Wash. 1985); Land v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 617 F. Supp.
52, 54-55 (E.D. Va. 1985); Jarvis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 1146, 1151-52 (D. Vt.
1985); Finn v. Davis, 610 F. Supp. 1079, 1082 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Niven v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,059, at 91,277 (M.D. Fla, 1985).
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have held that agreements to arbitrate Exchange Act claims are enforce-
able. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit have reaffirmed 8 their
pre-Byrd holdings9 that Exchange Act claims are nonarbitrable. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently confronted
this issue for the first time, and held that Exchange Act claims are nonar-
bitrable.10 Because the issue of arbitrability arises in almost all Exchange
Act claims brought against brokers and dealers, the resolution of this
issue will have a significant impact on Exchange Act litigation.
This note argues that valid public policy considerations continue to
support disallowing compelled arbitration of Securities Act claims."
The note demonstrates that the similarity between the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act-similarity both in certain statutory provisions and in
the general purpose of protecting investors-supports denying arbi-
trability to claims arising under the Exchange Act as well, notwithstand-
ing Justice White's concurrence. 12
I. ARBITRABILITY OF SECURITIES ACT CLAIMS: WILKO V. SWAN
A. The Wilko Doctrine-Securities Act Claims Nonarbitrable.
Before an investor establishes a securities or investment account
with a broker or dealer, the broker or dealer generally will require the
investor to enter into a written customer agreement.' 3 These standard
agreements usually require investors to submit to arbitration any dis-
putes arising from the relationship with the broker or dealer.14 The Fed-
eral Arbitration Act' 5 provides that such a written agreement to arbitrate
8. Miller v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 850, 854 (11th Cir. 1986); King v.
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 796 F.2d 59, 60 (5th Cir. 1986); McMahon v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1986).
9. Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023, 1025-26 (11th Cir. 1982);
Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 436-38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977); Sibley v. Tandy
Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 n.3 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977).
10. Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520, 524 (9th Cir. 1986).
11. See infra notes 33-49 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 122-45 and accompanying text.
13. See Exchange Act Release No. 15,984, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,122, at 81,976 (July 2, 1979).
14. Id. An arbitration clause in one such agreement read as follows:
Any controversy arising out of or relating to the account of the undersigned, to transac-
tions with you for the undersigned or to this Agreement or the breach thereof, shall be
settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules then in effect of the National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc. or the Board of Governors of the New York Stock Exchange or
the American Stock Exchange as the undersigned may elect.
Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F.2d 314, 315 n.2 (6th Cir. 1983).
15. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
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future disputes "shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."
16
Despite this general statutory mandate, the Supreme Court held in
Wilko v. Swan 17 that arbitration of a claim arising under section 12(2) of
the Securities Act could not be compelled. In Wilko, a securities buyer
who had signed margin agreements providing for the arbitration of all
future disputes brought an action in federal court against a securities bro-
kerage firm to recover damages for misrepresentation under section 12(2)
of the Securities Act."' The Supreme Court reinstated the district court's
denial of the defendant's motion to compel arbitration.1 9 The Court rec-
ognized that Congress intended the Arbitration Act to promote arbitra-
tion.20 The Court reasoned, however, that because the right to recover
under section 12(2) is a "special right"-in that the seller has the burden
of proving lack of scienter and the purchaser has a wide choice of
venue-differing from the common law right to recover for misrepresen-
tation,21 the Securities Act should prevail over the Arbitration Act.22
The Court declared itself compelled by the language of section 14 of
the Securities Act to hold the arbitration agreement unenforceable with
respect to the Securities Act claim.23 Section 14 provides that any "stip-
ulation" waiving compliance with any "provision" of the Securities Act
is void.24 The Court held that an agreement to arbitrate claims arising
under the Securities Act was such a stipulation because it infringed upon
the right of the purchaser to select the judicial forum.2 5
16. Id.§2.
17. 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).
18. Id. at 428-30.
19. Id. at 429-30, 438.
20. Id. at 431-32.
21. Id. at 431. Section 12(2) is enforceable in federal court or state court, and removal from
state court is prohibited. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982).
22. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
23. Id. at 434-35.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982). The Exchange Act has a similar nonwaiver provision, § 29(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982). The other acts under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission contain nonwaiver provisions as well. See Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 327, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77aaaa (1982); Public Utility Holding Company Act § 26(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46(a) (1982); Invest-
ment Advisers Act § 215(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15(a) (1982).
25. Id. The Court then discussed the policy reasons for protecting the purchaser's right to
select the forum:
While a buyer and seller of securities, under some circumstances, may deal at arm's length
on equal terms, it is clear that the Securities Act was drafted with an eye to the disadvan-
tages under which buyers labor. Issuers of and dealers in securities have better opportuni-
ties to investigate and appraise the prospective earnings and business plans affecting
securities than [do] buyers. It is therefore reasonable for Congress to put buyers of securi-
ties covered by that Act on a different basis from other purchasers. When the security
[Vol. 1986:548
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The assumption that arbitration would not provide as effective a
remedy for the violation of investors' rights was an important element of
the Court's decision in Wilko.26 The Court noted that arbitration would
be a less effective means to enforce the Securities Act for two reasons.
First, the arbitrator would be forced to make subjective findings on the
alleged violator's state of mind without judicial instruction on the law.27
Second, appellate review of arbitrators' decisions is restricted.28
Although arbitration has become widely accepted in recent years as
an alternative to litigation, Wilko remains good law. The Court contin-
ues to note the vitality of Wilko,29 and although the Byrd Court was
urged to overrule Wilko, it did not do so.30 Some commentators have
argued, however, that the rationale underlying Wilko is no longer
buyer, prior to any violation of the Securities Act, waives his right to sue in courts, he gives
up more than would a participant in other business transactions.
Id. at 435.
The Court's reference to the "disadvantages under which buyers labor" reflected a concern
about buyers' lack of access to information about securities. It is also important to note that buyers
labor under another disadvantage which justifies the protections extended them by Congress-they
often must accept the terms of an adhesion contract when purchasing securities. Yet an arbitration
agreement is seldom struck down on the ground that it is part of an adhesion contract. See McMa-
hon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 384, 386-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that
arbitration agreements are routinely upheld absent showing of fraud, duress, or inequality of bar-
gaining power), rev'd on other grounds, 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986); Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59, 61 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding alleged adhesion contracts to arbitrate
not "inherently unfair" and enforcing the agreements). But cf Richards v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 64 Cal. App. 3d 899, 902-06, 135 Cal. Rptr. 26, 27-30 (1977) (voiding adhe-
sion contract binding nonmember of New York Stock Exchange to arbitrate when arbitrators had
been selected pursuant to procedural rules deemed fundamentally unfair to reluctant nonmembers).
Furthermore, if a party alleges fraud in the inducement of the contract embodying the arbitration
agreement, a federal court will not invalidate the contract unless there has been fraud in the induce-
ment of the arbitration clause itself; the arbitrator will decide the issue of fraud in the inducement of
the general contract. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04
(1967).
26. Had the Court perceived arbitration to be fully effective in protecting investors, its opinion
would have rested solely on the nonwaiver provision of the Securities Act without any underlying
policy rationale.
27. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435-36.
28. Id. at 436.
In dissent, Justice Frankfurter stated: "There is nothing in the record before us, nor in the facts
of which we can take judicial notice, to indicate that the arbitral system as practiced in the City of
New York, and as enforceable under the supervisory authority of the District Court for the Southern
District of New York, would not afford the plaintiff the rights to which he is entitled." Id. at 439
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that judicial review of the arbitrator's decision
would safeguard against any misapplication or disregard of the law by an arbitrator. Id. at 440.
29. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3355
(1985); Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1240 n.1.
30. See Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1240 n.1.
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valid. 31 According to these commentators, courts should not exempt
federal securities claims from arbitration because arbitration has im-
proved to such an extent that-with some minor adjustments in arbitra-
tion procedures-it could safeguard investors' rights effectively. 32
Such arguments are not persuasive. Arbitration procedures have
not changed sufficiently since Wilko was decided to eliminate the Court's
fundamental objections to allowing adversaries to arbitrate Securities Act
claims. Arbitration is not as effective as adjudication in federal court as a
means of protecting investors' rights because the purposes underlying ar-
bitration fundamentally conflict with the right to a federal forum granted
under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. The primary purpose of
arbitration is the quick disposition of disputes. 33 Courts, in contrast, are
willing to sacrifice speed and incur expense because they are concerned
with reaching the "right" result.
Several differences between arbitration procedure and court proce-
dure could significantly affect the resolution of federal securities claims.
Not only are arbitrators free to dispense with formal rules of evidence, 34
but they are also not required to follow substantive principles of law.35
31. See Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 279,
312-14 (1984); Krause, Securities Litigation: The Unresolved Problem of Predispute Arbitration
Agreemenits for Pendent Claims, 29 DE PAUL L. REV. 693, 721 (1984).
32. As one commentator has stated:
Arbitration represents the only remedy that provides a meaningful dimension of due pro-
cess without the prohibitive costs, delay, and protractions of litigation. When weighed
against the potential dilution and waiver of certain substantive legal rights, arbitration
should be found to be an acceptable manner of resolving securities disputes. Accordingly,
once clear, unambiguous and fair arbitration provisions are formulated, Wilko v. Swan
must be overruled.
Krause, supra note 31, at 721. See also Katsoris, supra note 31, at 312-14 (arguing that Wilko's
restraint should be abolished once securities arbitration procedures are streamlined and placed under
jurisdiction of independent organization governed by members of public and securities industry).
But see L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1193 (1983) (labeling Wilko deci-
sion "eminently sensible"); Note, Federal and State Securities Claims: Litigation or Arbitration?, 61
WASH. L. REV. 245, 260-61 (1986) (arguing that Wilko should not be overruled until securities
arbitration has been "substantially improved").
33. Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972) ("[T]he very purpose of
arbitration ... is to provide a relatively quick, efficient and informal means of private dispute settle-
ment."); In re Arbitration Between Mole and Queen Ins. Co. of Am., 14 A.D.2d 1, 2-3, 217
N.Y.S.2d 330, 332 (1961) ("The principal purpose of arbitration is to reach a speedy and final result
and to avoid protracted litigation.").
34. See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES Rule 31 (American Arbitration Association 1986)
("[C]onformity to legal rules of evidence shall not be necessary."); CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCE-
DURE § 34 (National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. 1984) ("The arbitrators shall determine
the materiality and relevance of any evidence profferred and shall not be bound by rules governing
the admissibility of evidence."); see also M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, EVIDENCE IN ARBITRATION I
(1980) ("Since arbitration is essentially a fact-finding proceeding, the arbitrator is not bound by any
formal rules of evidence.").
35. See M. DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 25:01 (rev. ed. 1984) ("[A]rbitrators need
not follow otherwise applicable law when deciding issues before them unless they are commanded to
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In addition, the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure do not apply to arbitration proceedings. 36 Arbitrators are required
neither to state the reasons underlying their awards nor to make written
findings of fact,37 and judicial review of arbitration awards is quite lim-
ited.38 Furthermore, arbitrators are not bound by the doctrine of stare
do so by the terms of the arbitration agreement." (quoting University of Alaska v. Modern Constr.,
Inc., 522 P.2d 1132, 1140 (Alaska 1974))); Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An
Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REv. 481, 483 (1981) ("Arbitrators in this
country are not bound by substantive private law."). Cf Mentschikoff, CommercialArbitration, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 846, 861 (1961) (survey of American Arbitration Association arbitrators indicated
that 80% thought they ought to follow principles of substantive law but almost 90% believed they
were free to ignore them if they desired).
36. See Burton v. Bush, 614 F.2d 389, 390 (4th Cir. 1980) ("While an arbitration panel may
subpoena documents or witnesses, the litigating parties have no comparable privilege." (citation
omitted)); Foremost Yam Mills, Inc. v. Rose Mills, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 9, 11 (E.D. Pa. 1960) ("[I]n a
proceeding before arbitrators neither the statute nor the rules make available to any party thereto the
discovery procedures provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); see also Ferro Union
Corp. v. SS Ionic Coast, 43 F.R.D. 11, 13-14 (S.D. Tex. 1967) (judicially controlled discovery not
allowed in arbitration proceeding absent showing that "exceptional situation" exists). See generally
Katsoris, supra note 31, at 287 n.52 (comparing court discovery procedures to arbitration discovery
procedures).
Without the discovery rights provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an investor may
be placed at a substantial disadvantage in an arbitration proceeding against a broker or dealer, for
"without discovery [the investor] may be unable to learn the volume of commissions generated by
his account in relation to other accounts, the nature of recommendations made by the broker's
research department, and possible conflicts of interest." Comment, Arbitration of Investor-Broker
Disputes, 65 CALIF. L. REv. 120, 131 (1977). In contrast, the broker or dealer will have such infor-
mation in its possession, magnifying the disadvantages to the customer. Id. at 131-32.
37. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960) (arbi-
trators need not give reasons for an award); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203
(1956) (same); Case v. Alperson, 181 Cal. App. 2d 757, 761, 5 Cal. Rptr. 635, 638 (1960) (arbitrators
need not make findings of fact); M. DOMKE, supra note 35, § 29:06, at 435-36 (arbitrators need not
explain facts or make formal findings of fact).
The president of the American Arbitration Association has encouraged arbitrators not to write
opinions setting forth the reasons for their awards. See R. COULSON, BUSINESs ARBITRATION-
WHAT You NEED TO KNOW 26 (1980) ("Written opinions can be dangerous because they identify
targets for the losing party to attack."). Stenographic records of an arbitration hearing are not made
unless requested and paid for by one of the parties. See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES Rule
23 (American Arbitration Association 1986); CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE § 37 (National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. 1984).
If arbitrators were subject to judicial review and thus required to write opinions setting forth
findings of fact and conclusions of law, arbitration "would no longer resemble arbitration as it has
developed in this country, and no longer offer many of the advantages for which arbitration is
known." Sterk, supra note 35, at 484-85.
38. Nearly all states have adopted the provision of the Uniform Arbitration Act governing
judicial vacation of an arbitration award, and similar rules apply to federal courts under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982). G. GOLDBERG, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL AR-
BITRATION § 5.04, at 62 (1983). Under the Federal Arbitration Act, the Uniform Arbitration Act,
and similar statutes, there are four grounds for vacating an arbitration award:
(1) There was an undisclosed relationship between an arbitrator and a party or his
counsel affecting the arbitrator's impartiality or appearance of impartiality.
(2) An arbitrator was corrupt.
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decisis to follow prior arbitration decisions.39 Finally, the expertise of
federal judges in adjudicating federal law may often exceed that of arbi-
trators because arbitrators are not required to be lawyers. 40
(3) The arbitrators did not schedule or conduct the hearing in a fair and judicious
manner.
(4) The arbitrators granted relief that they were not authorized to grant under the
contract pursuant to which the arbitration was held.
Id. § 5.04, at 63.
Generally, courts will modify an arbitration award only when a mistake, such as a mistake in
calculation, is apparent on the face of the award. Id. § 5.05, at 63.
An arbitration award will not be overturned by a court for erroneous findings of fact or misin-
terpretations of the law by the arbitrator. See French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 1986). The arbitrator's decision must be confirmed by the court
unless it is "completely irrational," id. (quoting Swift Indus. v. Botany Indus., 466 F.2d 1125, 1131
(3d Cir. 1972)), or unless it is in "manifest disregard of the law." French, 784 F.2d at 906 (quoting
George Day Constr. Co. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 722 F.2d 1471, 1477 (9th Cir. 1984)). This
lax standard of review results from the desire to make arbitration both informal and binding: "An
occasional mistake by an arbitrator, left uncorrected by the courts, is the price that must be paid for
a healthy system of binding arbitration." R. COULSON, supra note 37, at 26.
Challenging an arbitration award on the basis of errors of fact or law is made even more difficult
by the common practice among arbitrators not to provide written opinions. See id. at 28 ("Because
commercial arbitrators do not write opinions explaining the reasons for their decision, it may be
difficult to determine whether an arbitrator has exceeded his or her powers. An undisclosed error of
judgment is therefore virtually immune from attack."); M. DoMKE, supra note 35, § 25:05, at 396
("Since the arbitrator does not have to state reasons for an award, whether and how he has applied
the substantive rules of law is difficult to ascertain when the award is being challenged.").
The difficulty an investor encounters in securing judicial review is illustrated in Sobel v. Hertz,
Warner & Co., 338 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 469 F.2d 1211 (2d Cir. 1972). Sobel, a
brokerage firm customer, elected to arbitrate a dispute involving claims of market manipulation and
fraud perpetrated by representatives of the brokerage firm. Id. at 289-91. After the arbitration panel
dismissed the claims without explanation, id. at 292, one of the firm's representatives was convicted
on conspiracy charges in connection with the same activity. Id. at 290-91. Sobel moved to vacate
the arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrators' determination ignored the federal securities
laws. The district court remanded the matter to the arbitrators "for an indication, now wholly
lacking from the record, of the basis on which the petitioner's claim was dismissed." Id. at 289, The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the arbitrators had no
obligation to clarify the reasons for the award if any ground for the decision could be inferred from
the facts. Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972).
One commentator has cited Sobel as a vivid example "that for all practical purposes there is no
right to appellate review of arbitration awards." E. BRODSKY, GUIDE TO SECURITIES LITIGATION
305 (1974). Another commentator states that the decision shows "that investors are likely to get
short shrift on their securities fraud claims submitted to arbitration." Comment, supra note 36, at
130.
Finally, judicial review of arbitration awards is further limited in that an arbitration award may
not be challenged on the ground of newly discovered evidence. See Levine v. Klein, 70 A.D.2d 532,
533, 416 N.Y.S.2d 28, 29 (1979); In re Arbitration Between Mole and Queen Ins. Co. of Am., 14
A.D.2d 1, 3, 217 N.Y.S.2d 330, 332 (1961); M. DOMKE, supra note 35, § 33:05, at 473-74.
39. See M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, supra note 34, at 40-41.
40. See M. DOMKE, supra note 35, § 21:01, at 317 ("There are no specific requirements with
respect to the qualifications of arbitrators in any arbitration statute in the United States."). More-
over, the arbitration panels provided by the New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock
Exchange may be biased, as they have a "high degree of securities industry representation." Com-
ment, supra note 36, at 123 & n.20.
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Moreover, Wilko should not be undermined because to do so would
conflict with congressional intent.41 Allowing investors and brokers to
require arbitration would violate the antiwaiver provision of the Securi-
ties Act and could thereby reinforce "the disadvantages under which [se-
curities] buyers labor."'42 If this policy is to change, Congress, not the
courts, should change it.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently demon-
strated its support for Wilko by adopting Rule 15c2-2, which makes it a
"fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive act or practice" for brokers or
dealers to purport to bind public customers to arbitrate future disputes
under the federal securities laws. 43 The SEC phased in this rule during
1984 by allowing brokers and dealers to continue to use preexisting cus-
tomer agreement forms but requiring them to disclose in writing that the
customer need not arbitrate disputes arising under the federal securities
laws.44 In announcing the adoption of this rule, the SEC noted that
courts had consistently held claims arising under the Securities Act and
Exchange Act to be nonarbitrable.4 5 The SEC decided to adopt Rule
15c2-2, however, because brokers and dealers continued to include un-
restricted arbitration clauses in customer agreement forms.46
41. The basic purpose of the Securities Act is to protect investors against fraud and misrepre-
sentation by issuers and sellers of securities. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1933); H.R.
REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1933). See also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375, 383 (1983) ("[The basic purpose of the [Securities] Act [is] to provide greater protection to
purchasers of registered securities."); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953) ("The
design of the [Securities Act] is to protect investors .... ). Although there is no legislative history
explaining the specific purpose of section 14, the nonwaiver provision of the Act, that provision
clearly is consistent with the Act's general purpose of protecting investors against fraud and misrep-
resentation. Thus, to the extent that a predispute agreement to arbitrate requires an investor to
forfeit the procedural protections of federal court, see supra note 34-40 and accompanying text,
judicial enforcement of such an agreement conflicts with the congressional intent underlying the
Securities Act.
42. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435.
43. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2(a) (1985).
44. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2(b) (1985). This disclosure requirement was in effect from De-
cember 28, 1983, to December 31, 1984. Id. The broker or dealer who chose to use existing supplies
of customer agreement forms bearing the standard arbitration clause was required to make the fol-
lowing written disclosure:
Although you have signed a customer agreement form with FIRM NAME that states that
you are required to arbitrate any future dispute or controversy that may arise between us,
you are not required to arbitrate any dispute or controversy that arises under the federal
securities laws but instead can resolve any such dispute or controversy through litigation in
the courts.
Id.
45. See Exchange Act Release No. 20,397, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,452, at 86,357 (Nov. 18, 1983).
46. See id. The SEC had noted in an earlier release that customers who sign broker-dealer
agreements are frequently not well informed of their rights, and consequently, "a customer who
receives from the broker-dealer a demand for arbitration pursuant to the customer agreement may
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The SEC also indicated its support for extending Wilko's protection
against arbitrability to the Exchange Act.47 By its terms, Rule 15c2-2
applies to "the Federal securities laws" 48 and thus appears to apply
equally to the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. However, courts
have interpreted the rule as implementing, not changing, the existing law
on arbitrability. 49 Because the law on this issue is not entirely settled,
Rule 15c2-2 will not by itself prevent the arbitration of Exchange Act
claims.
B. Limitations on the Wilko Doctrine.
The Wilko doctrine is not absolute; Congress and the Supreme
Court have imposed some direct limitations on it. In Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 50 the Court refused to hold that Wilko prevented the arbitra-
tion of Exchange Act claims pursuant to an arbitration clause contained
in an international agreement entered into by parties of equal bargaining
power. The Court emphasized the international character of the contract
and noted that conflict-of-laws problems not present in Wilko were im-
plicated.5 1 The Court reasoned that a refusal to enforce the arbitration
agreement would have jeopardized the interests of the party forced to
litigate under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction and might have deterred
businesses from entering into future international commercial
not be aware that he or she may have the right to avoid arbitration if there is a claim arising under
the federal securities laws." Exchange Act Release No. 15,984, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) % 82,122, at 81,977-78 (July 2, 1979). According to the SEC, some customers might
have been induced by the representations of the broker-dealer to submit their claims to arbitration
while others might have been induced to forgo pursuing their claims at all. Id. at 81,978. The
representations could thereby "effectively deprive[ ]" investors of their right to choose an alternate
forum. Id.
47. See Exchange Act Release No. 20,397, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L, Rep,
(CCH) 1 83,452, at 86,357 (Nov. 18, 1983). The SEC suggested that Wilko's protection against
arbitrability should extend to other federal securities laws as well:
Several commentators noted that to date predispute arbitration clauses have been held
unenforceable only with respect to causes of action arising under the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.... These commentators have cited no basis upon
which the Commission can determine that the Wilko analysis does not hold equally true
for other federal securities acts, which contain substantially identical anti-waiver provi-
sions.
Id at 86,357 n.6.
48. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2 (1985).
49. See Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393, 1398 n.17 (8th
Cir. 1986). The rule was drafted carefully so that it would not conflict with the exceptions to the
Wilko doctrine allowing arbitration of existing disputes, arbitration of disputes between members of
national exchanges, and arbitration of disputes arising from international transactions. Exchange
Act Release No. 20,397, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,452, at 86,357-
58 (Nov. 18, 1983). For a discussion of the exceptions to the Wilko doctrine, see infra notes 50-60
and accompanying text.
50. 417 U.S. 506, 519-21 (1974).
51. Id. at 515-18.
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transactions.5 2
In addition, Wilko does not bar the arbitration of disputes between
members of national securities exchanges or the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD). Section 28(b) of the Exchange Act provides
that the nonwaiver provision in section 29(a) does not prevent the en-
forcement of agreements by self-regulatory organizations to settle dis-
putes between their members.5 3 Courts therefore regularly require
arbitration of disputes between members of self-regulatory organizations
arising under the Exchange Act.54 One commentator has stated that sec-
tion 28(b) reflects the congressional belief that members of national se-
curities exchanges are sophisticated and therefore do not need the
protection of the nonwaiver provisions.55 Although the Securities Act
does not contain a provision equivalent to section 28(b) of the Exchange
Act, 56 courts have upheld the arbitration of like disputes arising under
the Securities Act.5 7 Furthermore, most courts wil enforce a predispute
arbitration clause when both parties are generally knowledgeable about
the securities industry and are negotiating at arms length from positions
of equal bargaining power.5 8
52. Id. at 517-18. Cf AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. Partnership, 740 F.2d 148, 157-59
(2d Cir. 1984) (agreement between Dutch investor and Dutch investment partnership to resolve all
disputes in the Netherlands under Dutch law held enforceable, notwithstanding section 29(a) of the
Exchange Act); Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 565 F.2d 1194, 1200 (7th Cir. 1977)
(Commodity Exchange Act does not bar arbitration of international commodity dispute), cert. de-
nied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Lecopulos, 553 F.2d 842,
844 (2d Cir. 1977) (same).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(b) (1982). The NASD is the only securities association registered as a
self-regulatory organization under section 15A of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1982). See
T. HAZEN, THE LAV OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 10.2, at 259 (1984). Ten national securities
exchanges, including the New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange, qualify and
are registered as self-regulatory organizations under section 6 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f
(1982). See T. HAZEN, supra, § 10.2, at 259. All broker-dealers are now required to be members of
either a national exchange or a registered securities association that qualifies as a self-regulatory
organization. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
54. See, e.g., Tullis v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 551 F.2d 632, 637-38 (5th Cir. 1977); Coenen v. R.W.
Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1213-14 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972); N. Donald &
Co. v. American United Energy Corp., 585 F. Supp. 533, 535-36 (D. Colo.), aft'd, 746 F.2d 666
(10th Cir. 1984).
55. See Peloso, Agreements to Arbitrate, 13 REv. SEC. REG. 943, 947 (1980).
56. See Axelrod & Co. v. Kordich, Victor & Neufeld, 451 F.2d 838, 843 (2d Cir. 1971); Peloso,
supra note 55, at 947; see also Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F. Supp. 766, 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
("Permitting broker-dealers to agree in advance to arbitrate controversies arising between them
would not appear to offend the congressional intent underlying passage of the [Securities] Act.").
57. See Tullis v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 551 F.2d 632, 633 n.1, 637-38 (5th Cir. 1977); Axelrod &
Co. v. Kordich, Victor & Neufeld, 451 F.2d 838, 843 (2d Cir. 1971); Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co.,
287 F. Supp. 766, 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
58. See Katsoris, supra note 31, at 295 & n.1 15; Peloso, supra note 55, at 946-47; see also Alco
Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (suggesting validity of arbitration
clause negotiated at arm's length between sophisticated investors); GCA Corp. v. Coler, [1971-1972
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Finally, Wilko does not bar enforcement of an agreement to submit
an existing dispute-as opposed to a future dispute-to arbitration, even
if the dispute involves claims arising under the Securities Act or the Ex-
change Act.5 9 Courts will uphold such agreements, which waive the
right to bring an action in court, provided the waiving party has sufficient
knowledge to make an informed waiver.60
C. Application of Wilko to the Exchange Act.
Although Wilko bars the arbitration of Securities Act claims (sub-
ject to a few well-defined exceptions 61), Wilko's applicability to Exchange
Act claims is less certain. The Supreme Court first addressed this issue
in 1974 in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 62 In Scherk, the Court stated in
dictum 63 that "a colorable argument could be made" that Wilko does not
bar arbitration of an implied cause of action arising under section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act.64 The Court distinguished the " 'special right' of a
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,339, at 91,815 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("IThe public policy
offended by a brokerage house customer's relinquishment of his right to sue in the courts is not
offended by a similar relinquishment made between parties who deal at arm's length from equal
bargaining positions."). But see Miller v. Schweickart, 405 F. Supp. 366, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (re-
fusing to undertake subjective determination of whether plaintiff was sophisticated); Newman v.
Shearson, Hammill & Co., 383 F. Supp. 265, 268 (W.D. Tex. 1974) ("The federal securities laws do
not distinguish between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors .. "); Krause, supra note 31, at
703 n.58 (noting that some courts have refused to apply the "sophisticated investor" exception).
59. See Gardner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 433 F.2d 367, 368 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 978 (1971); Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 389 F.2d 242, 246 (3d Cir. 1968);
Katsoris, supra note 31, at 295 & n.116; Peloso, supra note 55, at 948.
60. See Malena v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,492, at 98,449 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) ("The Wilko Court did not seek to prohibit
voluntary arbitration; rather, it sought to prevent and protect an investor from unknowingly waiving
a right granted by the federal securities law."); L. Loss, supra note 32, at 1191-92 (although non-
waiver provisions void waivers by agreement, they do not preclude waiver by conduct or settlements
of existing controversies). In order for the dispute to be an "existing controversy," the investor must
be aware that a dispute exists and that it involves potential securities laws violations. See Malena v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
91,492, at 98,450 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
Existing disputes under federal antitrust laws may likewise be submitted to arbitration even
though predispute arbitration agreements will not be enforced. See Sterk, supra note 35, at 508.
Public policy can explain this difference in treatment: the public has a strong stake in the proper
enforcement of antitrust claims, and regularly submitting those claims to arbitration might fail to
protect the public interest adequately. Once there is an existing antitrust claim, however, the parties
may settle it by whatever means they choose, including by arbitration, because there is no public
policy against the voluntary settlement of private antitrust claims. Id. at 508 & n.96.
61. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
62. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
63. The Court assumed for the purposes of its decision "that the operative portions of the
language of the 1933 Act relied upon in Wilko are contained in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
." Id. at 515.
64. Id. at 513.
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private remedy for civil liability" provided by section 12(2) of the Securi-
ties Act from the implied private cause of action under section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act, noting that "the [Exchange] Act itself does not estab-
lish the 'special right' that the Court in Wilko found significant. ' 65 The
Court further distinguished Wilko on the ground that the Exchange Act
does not guarantee plaintiffs the wide choice of forum that section 22 of
the Securities Act guarantees. 66
Despite the Court's dictum in Scherk, all federal courts of appeals
that addressed the issue during the decade following Scherk held Wilko
applicable to Exchange Act claims.67 These courts relied primarily on an
Exchange Act provision barring the waiver of any of the Act's provi-
sions. 68 This nonwaiver provision is practically identical to the non-
waiver provision in the Securities Act-the provision on which the Wilko
Court based its decision.6 9 The courts accordingly reasoned that because
the general purposes underlying each Act are the same, the nonwaiver
provision in each should preclude arbitration agreements from infringing
upon the protection of federal jurisdiction.70 These courts distinguished
65. Id. at 513-14.
66. Id. at 514. The Court compared the jurisdictional provision of the Securities Act with that
of the Exchange Act and noted that section 22 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1982), allows a
plaintiff to bring an action in either federal or state court and prohibits removal from state court,
whereas section 27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982), provides for suit only in federal
district courts with "exclusive jurisdiction." Scherk, 417 U.S. at 514. This provision of the Ex-
change Act, according to the Court, "significantly restrict[s] the plaintiff's choice of forum." Id.
67. See Raiford v. Buslease Inc., 745 F.2d 1419, 1421 (11th Cir. 1984); Mansbach v. Prescott,
Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1030 (6th Cir. 1979), vacated, Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc. v.
Board of Trade, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590
F.2d 823, 827-29 (10th Cir. 1978); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558
F.2d 831, 833-36 (7th Cir. 1977); Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 437-38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432
U.S. 910 (1977); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 n.3 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
824 (1977); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532, 536-37 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976).
Three other circuits, in dictum, expressed support for the argument that Wilko extends to Ex-
change Act claims. See Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59, 61 (8th Cir.
1984); Ingbar v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 683 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1982); De Lancie v.
Birr, Wilson & Co., 648 F.2d 1255, 1257-59 (9th Cir. 1981). The Fourth Circuit has not addressed
the issue. See Blomquist v. Churchill, 633 F. Supp. 131, 133 n.4 (D.S.C. 1985).
68. Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982), provides: "Any condition,
stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter
or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be
void."
69. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. Section 14 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77n (1982), provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any
security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of
the Commission shall be void."
70. As one court stated:
It is enough to say that the Supreme Court found prospective waivers of the right to judi-
cial trial and review to be inconsistent with Congress' overriding concern for the protection
of investors .... We are not ... persuaded that either the differences between the rights
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Scherk on the ground that the parties in Scherk had equal bargaining
power and were involved in an international transaction.71
II. BYRD AND THE ARBITRABILITY OF EXCHANGE ACT CLAIMS
A. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd.
The federal courts at one time applied two different procedures for
accommodating the joinder of arbitrable state claims with nonarbitrable
federal claims. Some courts adopted a bifurcated approach, which in-
volved severing the arbitrable claims and directing that such claims be
arbitrated. 72 Other courts embraced the "intertwining doctrine"-when
the arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims were legally and factually inter-
twined, the court would deny a motion to arbitrate the state claims and
would exercise pendent jurisdiction to adjudicate those claims.73
The Supreme Court resolved this split in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
v. Byrd.74 The plaintiff, A. Lamar Byrd, had invested $160,000 in securi-
ties through broker-dealer Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 75 Shortly after
Byrd made the investment, the value of his account declined by more
than $100,000.76 Byrd sued Dean Witter in federal court, alleging viola-
tions of sections 10(b), 15(c), and 20 of the Exchange Act.77 He joined
several state claims with the federal claim; jurisdiction over the state
claims was predicated on diversity of citizenship and pendent
jurisdiction.78
Byrd's customer agreement provided that all disputes arising out of
his relationship with Dean Witter would be settled by arbitration.79
granted in the 1933 and 1934 Acts or any consideration of policy warrant such a distinc-
tion.
Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532, 536 (3d Cir.) (citations omit-
ted), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976). See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 829 (10th Cir. 1978) (stating that the remedy under Rule lOb-5 should not be
relegated to inferior position, since it is "the most important remedy in both Acts").
71. See Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 835 (7th Cir.
1977).
72. The Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits opted for bifurcated proceedings. See Surman v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59, 62 (8th Cir. 1984); Liskey v. Oppenheimer &
Co., 717 F.2d 314, 317-21 (6th Cir. 1983); Dickinson v. Heinold See., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 644-46 (7th
Cir. 1981).
73. The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits adopted the intertwining approach. See Byrd v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 726 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985); Belke
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023, 1026 (1lth Cir. 1982); Sibley v. Tandy
Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977).
74. 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985).
75. Id. at 1239.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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Dean Witter accordingly filed a motion to sever the state claims and or-
der their arbitration, and to stay arbitration of those claims pending reso-
lution of the federal action.80 Dean Witter did not seek arbitration of the
Exchange Act claim, in accordance with the holdings of lower courts
extending Wilko to actions arising under the Exchange Act.81 The dis-
trict court denied the motion to sever the pendent state claims and com-
pel their arbitration,8 2 and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, adopting the intertwining doctrine, affirmed.8 3
After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the petitioner, Dean
Witter, and the Securities Industry Association, as amicus curiae, urged
the Court to overrule the post-Scherk courts and to hold that claims
brought under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act are arbitrable.84 In a
footnote, the Court said that this issue was not before it and declined to
overrule the lower courts.8 5 The Court's decision instead focused on
whether to adopt the intertwining or bifurcated approach.
In adopting the bifurcated approach, the Court held that the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act requires that district courts compel arbitration of all
claims that are subject to arbitration, even if bifurcated and potentially
inefficient proceedings result.8 6 The Court looked to the plain language
of the Federal Arbitration Act, which provides that written agreements
to arbitrate disputes arising out of an existing contract "shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract. '8 7 Byrd had argued that the
Federal Arbitration Act's primary purpose was to provide for quick and
efficient resolution of disputes-a purpose that would be frustrated by
inefficient bifurcated proceedings.88 The Court dismissed this argument
and stated that the primary purpose of the Act was to ensure the enforce-
ment of private agreements to arbitrate.8 9 The Court directed the parties
to arbitrate the severed state claims without stay, rejecting Byrd's argu-
ment that arbitration of those claims would collaterally estop the litiga-
tion of federal claims.90
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1239-40.
82. Id. The district court opinion is not reported.
83. Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 726 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1984), rey'd, 105 S. Ct.
1238 (1985).
84. Brief for Petitioner at 4-6 n.3; Brief for the Securities Industry Association, Inc., et al. as
Amicus Curiae at 5-15.
85. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1240 n.I.
86. Id. at 1241.
87. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
88. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1241-42.
89. IM at 1242 & nn.6-7.
90. Id. at 1243-44.
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B. White's Concurrence and Arbitrability of Exchange Act Claims.
Only Justice White, concurring, restated the Scherk dictum and
suggested that Wilko should not be extended to claims arising under the
Exchange Act. Justice White stated that "Wilko's reasoning cannot be
mechanically transplanted to claims arising under the Exchange Act."9'
White repeated the arguments advanced in Scherk: that jurisdiction
under the Exchange Act is narrower than jurisdiction under the Securi-
ties Act; that the cause of action under section 10(b) is implied rather
than express, so that section 14 of the Exchange Act, which bars waiver
of "compliance with any provision of this chapter," literally does not ap-
ply; and that an implied right of action under section 10(b) does not rise
to the level of the "special right" under section 12(2) of the Securities
Act protected in Wilko. 92 Justice White did not elaborate upon these
arguments, explain them, or supply any original reasoning.
C. Judicial Response to White's Concurrence.
Relying on Justice White's concurrence, many district courts have
held that Wilko does not apply to Exchange Act claims and have ordered
parties to arbitrate those claims pursuant to valid arbitration clauses in
broker-dealer contracts. 93 Some of these courts94 have also relied on a
subsequent decision, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 9- which held that federal antitrust claims arising out of an interna-
91. Id. at 1244 (White, J., concurring).
92. Id. Ironically, Justice White had joined in Justice Douglas's dissent in Scherk, where Jus-
tice Douglas argued that Wilko should apply with equal force to section 10(b) actions. Scherk, 417
U.S. at 521 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
93. See supra note 7.
94. See Ross v. Mathis, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,343, at
92,248 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Finkle & Ross v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1505, 1510
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Geller v. Nasser, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) q 92,409,
at 92,512 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
95. 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3355-61 (1985). In Mitsubishi, the Court addressed the question whether
claims arising under the federal antitrust laws could be arbitrated pursuant to an arbitration agree-
ment between parties involved in an international transaction. Id. at 3353. In holding the arbitra-
tion agreement enforceable, the Court rejected the argument that federal statutory claims are
entitled to a blanket presumption of nonarbitrability. Id. The Court emphasized the policy underly-
ing the Federal Arbitration Act and held that arbitration agreements should be enforced absent
countervailing congressional intent:
We must assume that if Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by a given
statute to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention
will be deducible from the text or legislative history .... Having made the bargain to
arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.
Id. at 3355.
After noting the absence of a provision in either the Sherman Act or the Federal Arbitration
Act precluding the waiver of judicial remedies under the federal antitrust laws, id., the Court con-
cluded that the policies favoring arbitration of international disputes outweighed the policies oppos-
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tional transaction are arbitrable. Other district courts have merely noted
the strong federal policy favoring arbitration agreements. 96 A sizable mi-
nority of district courts, however, have held Exchange Act claims nonar-
bitrable, 97 generally on the basis of precedent within the circuits-
precedent that Byrd or Mitsubishi did not directly overrule. 98
Following the Byrd decision, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to rule on the
arbitrability of Exchange Act claims. In McMahon v. Shearson/Ameri-
can Express, Inc.,99 the court held that claims arising under section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 are nonarbitrable. The plaintiffs, customers of a broker-
age firm, alleged that a representative of the defendant firm violated sec-
tion 10(b) by churning the customers' accounts, making false statements,
and omitting material facts from investment advice.100 The plaintiffs had
entered into a customer agreement that contained a standard arbitration
clause.101 The brokerage firm moved to compel arbitration of the cus-
tomers' claims on the basis of the arbitration clause,10 2 and the district
court ordered arbitration of the section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims.10 3
The Second Circuit reversed, holding the claims nonarbitrable. 1°4
The court first looked to the Second Circuit precedent holding Exchange
Act claims nonarbitrable. 10 5 The court refused to overrule this precedent
based only upon the defendant's "speculati[on] as to what the Supreme
ing arbitration of federal antitrust claims, and accordingly held the claims to be arbitrable. Id. at
3355-61.
96. See Prawer v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 92,395, at 92,436-37 (D. Mass. 1985); Moncrieff v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1005, 1007-08 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
97. See Bustamante v. Rotan Mosle, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 303, 306-07 (S.D. Tex. 1986); Bale v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 650, 654-55 (D. Minn. 1986); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch &
Co., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 92,504, at 93,059-63 (S.D. Ohio 1986);
Webb v. R. Rowland & Co., 613 F. Supp. 1123, 1123-24 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Levendag v. Churchill,
623 F. Supp. 620, 621-22 (D.S.C. 1985); Robert A. Stone & Assocs. v. Drexel Burnham Lambert,
Inc., No. 85 C 6927 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Adams v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
92,328, at 92,175 (W.D. Okla. 1985); Leone v. Advest, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 297, 302-03 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
98. See Lamb v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., No. 85-1316 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1985)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Leone v. Advest, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 297, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Baker v. Powell, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 1 92,407, at 92,504-05
(D.N.J. 1985).
99. 788 F.2d 94, 96-98 (2d Cir. 1986).
100. Id. at 96.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 384, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
104. McMahon, 788 F.2d at 96-98.
105. Id. at 96-97.
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Court may do with our settled law." 10 6 In effect, the court stated that a
more authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court in favor of
arbitrability of Exchange Act claims would be required before it would
overrule clear precedent within the Second Circuit. 0 7
The court .also looked to the public policy considerations implicated
by the arbitration of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims, noting that
"[t]he securities laws generally, and the implied causes of action which
the courts have recognized, are designed to protect the public, and par-
ticularly the less sophisticated investor."' 1 8 Noting the similarity be-
tween the nonwaiver provisions of the Acts and the similarity between
the public policy concerns that underlie the Acts, the court concluded
that there is a "compelling need for a judicial forum in the resolution of
securities law disputes."10 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in
Miller v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 110 and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in King v. Drexel Burnham Lambert,
Inc.,"'1 also held that section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims are not arbi-
trable. In brief opinions, the courts held themselves bound by prior pre-
cedent and accordingly refused to order the arbitration of Exchange Act
claims.112
Despite the position taken by the Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held in
Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 113 that Exchange
Act claims can be arbitrated pursuant to a predispute agreement to arbi-
trate. Unlike the Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits, the Eighth Cir-
cuit had no precedent extending Wilko's prohibition against arbitration
to claims arising under the Exchange Act. 114 The court relied on Justice
White's concurring opinion in Byrd11 5 and the "strong federal policy
favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements."' 1 6 The court did not
106. Id. at 97.
107. Id. at 98.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 791 F.2d 850, 854 (1lth Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
111. 796 F.2d 59, 60 (5th Cir. 1986).
112. Miller, 791 F.2d at 853-54 (reaffirming Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693
F.2d 1023 (11th Cir. 1982)); King, 796 F.2d at 60 (reaffirming Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540,
543 n.3 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977)).
113. 795 F.2d 1393, 1399 (8th Cir. 1986).
114. In an Eighth Circuit case decided before Byrd, Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 733 F.2d 59, 61 (8th Cir. 1984), the court noted that lower federal courts had consistently
held that Wilko applied to the Exchange Act. This statement, however, was dictum. See Phillips,
795 F.2d at 1399.
115. Phillips, 795 F.2d at 1397-98.
116. Id. at 1398.
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develop or explain Justice White's arguments, and merely concluded that
"[t]he non-waiver provision of the 1934 Act, section 29(a), simply does
not override the Arbitration Act in the same manner as section 14 of the
1933 Act when it is not buttressed by special rights and broad jurisdic-
tional provisions similar to those found in the 1933 Act."
117
Judge Ross dissented. He emphasized public policy considerations
and the similarity between the nonwaiver provisions of the Securities Act
and the Exchange Act. He also noted that the decisions of eight other
courts of appeals supported extending Wilko to the Exchange Act.
1 18
Finally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
has also taken a position on the issue. In Conover v. Dean Witter Reyn-
olds, Inc., 119 the court held that section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims are
nonarbitrable. The court was not bound by precedent 120 but based its
decision upon the nonwaiver provision of the Exchange Act and the poli-
cies underlying the federal securities laws. 121
III. APPLICABILITY OF WILKO TO EXCHANGE ACT CLAIMS
As noted above, since Byrd most district courts faced with the issue
of arbitrability of Exchange Act claims have held that such claims are
arbitrable. This is surprising. Granted, these decisions are supported by
Justice White's concurrence in Byrd. But Justice White's statement on
this issue is mere dictum, as was the Scherk Court's statement on this
issue eleven years earlier.' 22 Given that every federal court of appeals
that addressed the issue prior to Byrd disregarded the dictum in Scherk
and held that Exchange Act claims are nonarbitrable, 123 district courts
should consider themselves bound by precedent as did the Second Circuit
in McMahon, the Fifth Circuit in King, and the Eleventh Circuit in
Miller unless they consider the rationale underlying Justice White's con-
currence in Byrd to be exceptionally persuasive.
Even in the absence of binding precedent, the position adopted by
the Second, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits is correct. Justice
White's arguments in favor of allowing the arbitration of Exchange Act
claims are flawed in several respects. Justice White first focused on the
jurisdictional differences between the Securities Act and the Exchange
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1400 (Ross, J., dissenting).
119. 794 F.2d 520, 527 (9th Cir. 1986).
120. Id. at 522.
121. Id at 522-27.
122. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text. Justice White's concurrence in Byrd was not
joined by any other Justice, whereas the opinion of the Court in Scherk was supported by five Jus-
tices. See Scherk 417 U.S. at 507.
123. See supra note 67.
Vol. 1986:548]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Act and noted that claims arising under the Securities Act can be as-
serted in either federal court or state court, whereas claims arising under
the Exchange Act can be asserted only in federal court.1 24 This same
point was made in Scherk. Neither Justice White's concurrence in Byrd
nor the Court's opinion in Scherk explained why this jurisdictional differ-
ence should be relevant to the arbitrability of Exchange Act claims. The
relevance of the point appears to be grounded in the statement in Wilko
that "the right to select the judicial forum is the kind of 'provision' that
cannot be waived under § 14 of the Securities Act."1 25 In other words,
Justice White appears to be arguing that because the Exchange Act does
not give the plaintiff a choice of forum, the plaintiff has not waived any
provision of the Act by agreeing to arbitrate.
This argument does not withstand close analysis. First, the fact that
the Exchange Act does not give the plaintiff a choice of forum does not
imply that the plaintiff must forfeit his right to bring an action in federal
court. The jurisdictional provision of the Exchange Act, section 27,126
expressly extends the protection of the federal courts to investors. A pro-
spective agreement to arbitrate any future Exchange Act claim would be
a waiver of compliance with this provision, in violation of section 29(a) of
the Act.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has inter-
preted section 27 of the Exchange Act as "an even more forceful indica-
tion of Congress' intent" than section 22 of the Securities Act that federal
courts rather than arbitrators exercise jurisdiction over the claims.' 27
This corresponds with the arguments traditionally asserted in support of
exclusive federal jurisdiction under the Exchange Act-"(1) promotion
of uniform interpretation, (2) greater expertise of federal judges,
(3) avoidance of state courts' hostility to 'unfamiliar federal claims aris-
ing in familiar state law contract actions' and (4) the 'disparate impact' of
state and federal discovery provisions"t 28 -which all tend to support
protecting Exchange Act claims against arbitration. 29
124. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1244 (White, J., concurring).
125. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435.
126. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982).
127. Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520, 527 (9th Cir. 1986).
128. Hazen, Allocation of Jurisdiction Between the State and Federal Courts for Private Remedies
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 60 N.C.L. REv. 707, 720 (1982).
129. Uniform interpretation of the Exchange Act will be promoted to a greater extent in the
federal courts because arbitrators are not bound to follow prior arbitration decisions. See M. HILL
& A. SINICROPI, supra note 34, at 40-41 (arbitrators may choose to follow the precedent of prior
arbitration awards but are not required to do so). The expertise of federal judges in adjudicating
federal law will often exceed that of arbitrators because arbitrators are not necessarily lawyers. See
supra note 40 and accompanying text. Arbitrators unfamiliar with the federal securities laws will
not only lack the expertise of federal judges but also might have the "hostility" to federal claims
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But both the Ninth Circuit and Justice White are making too much
of the difference between the jurisdictional provisions of the two Acts
because, as the American Law Institute has noted, this distinction exists
by "pure happenstance."' 130 Because the difference between the jurisdic-
tional provisions occurred by chance, Justice White is incorrect in inter-
preting section 27 of the Exchange Act as expressing congressional intent
that Exchange Act claims are more appropriately subject to arbitration
than are Securities Act claims.
Justice White also asserted that because a private cause of action
under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act is implied rather than express,
the Act's provision prohibiting waiver of "compliance with any provision
of this chapter, rule or regulation thereunder" literally does not apply.
131
This argument exalts form over substance by drawing an unjustifiable
technical distinction. If it were true that the nonwaiver provisions did
not apply to implied causes of action, then nothing would prevent inves-
tors from prospectively waiving all implied rights to recover. Yet courts
have not allowed investors to waive implied rights prospectively, because
courts have recognized that permitting such waivers could emasculate
the protections that these implied rights of action afford. 132 In effect,
similar to that which state judges are thought to possess. The "disparate impact" of discovery proce-
dures may be greater between federal courts and arbitration than between federal courts and state
courts. Broad discovery is not generally available in arbitration. See supra note 36.
130. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 183 (1969). One commentator traced the jurisdictional provision of
the Exchange Act through the entire legislative process and found no articulated reason for the
choice of exclusive federal jurisdiction rather than concurrent state and federal jurisdiction under the
Exchange Act. Note, The Securities Exchange Act and the Rule of Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 89
YALE L.J. 95, 109 n.58 (1979).
131. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1244 (White, J., concurring). The logical extension of this argument is
that the enforceability of arbitration agreements should depend on whether the cause of action is
express or implied, rather than whether the claim arises under the Securities Act or the Exchange
Act. Cf Brener v. Becker Paribas, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that claim
brought under section 17(a) of Securities Act is arbitrable because private cause of action under that
section is implied). Several private rights of action under the Exchange Act are express, see Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1977), and some rights of action under the Securities Act are
implied. See Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995
(1979).
132. See Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 402 (7th Cir. 1978) ("Section 29(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as interpreted by the courts, mandates that a purported release of claims
under [Rule 10b-5] is valid only as to mature, ripened claims of which the releasing party had knowl-
edge before signing the release." (footnotes omitted)), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979); Korn v.
Franchard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 1326, 1329 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (section 29(a) disallows anticipatory
waiver of right to litigate Rule lOb-5 claims; it does not disallow settlement of matured claims); see
also 5C A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE lOb-5 § 237.02, at 10-73 to -74
(1986) ("Judges have not permitted a plaintiff to waive a lOb-5 right before the right matures or
before he knows it exists." (footnotes omitted)); Note, Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act:
A "Legislative Chaperon"for Rule l0b-5, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 499, 502 (1968) ("[There is little doubt
that section 29(a) also applies to the judicially created private right of action under Rule 10b-.").
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then, an implied cause of action is treated as if it were literally a provi-
sion of one of the Acts.
The final argument Justice White advanced was that "Wilko's solici-
tude for the federal cause of action-the 'special right' established by
Congress-is not necessarily appropriate where the cause of action is ju-
dicially implied and not so different from the common law action.' t33
Justice White thus intimated that the implied rights under the Acts are
less worthy of protection than the rights expressly provided in the Acts.
This suggestion is novel and has far-reaching implications. The as-
sumption underlying this argument appears to be that courts have gratui-
tously bestowed the implied rights under the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act upon investors. This suggestion conflicts with a funda-
mental principle underlying the implied rights-that implying private
causes of action is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Acts. 134 As
the Court has clearly explained, private remedies are implied "where
congressional purposes are likely to be undermined absent private
enforcement." 135
Moreover, there is no justification for the notion that once a court
has recognized an implied right of action under the securities laws, that
right should be entitled to less protection than an express cause of action.
In no other context has the Court provided less procedural protection to
an implied private cause of action than an express cause of action.
Granted, the Court has been circumspect in implying causes of action136
and has imposed strict requirements on section 10(b) actions with regard
See generally A. JACOBS, supra, § 237.02 (discussing the enforceability of waivers and settlements in
Rule lOb-5 litigation).
133. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. at 1244 (White, J., concurring) (citation and footnote omitted).
134. See Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520, 524-25 (9th Cir. 1986); see also
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 62 (1975) ("Of course, we have not hesitated to
recognize the power of federal courts to fashion private remedies for securities laws violations when
to do so is consistent with the legislative scheme and necessary for the protection of investors as a
supplement to enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission." (emphasis added)); J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) ("Private enforcement of the proxy rules [enacted
pursuant to section 14(a) of the Exchange Act] provides a necessary supplement to Commission
action." (emphasis added)). Cf. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 317 (1979) (private right of
action not "necessary" to carry out congressional purpose under the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1905); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 41 (1977) ("[Judicially creating a damages action
in favor of Chris-Craft [under section 14(e) of the Securities Act] is unnecessary to ensure the fulfill-
ment of Congress' purposes in adopting the Williams Act." (emphasis added)); Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 84-85 (1975) (private cause of action would "not aid the primary congressional goal" of 18
U.S.C. § 610).
135. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 25 (1977).
136. See, eg., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 567 (1979) (denying implied cause
of action under section 17(a) of Exchange Act); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 42 (1977)
(defeated tender offeror has no implied cause of action under section 14(e) of Exchange Act).
[Vol. 1986:548
Vol. 1986:548] SECURITIES ARBITRATION
to standing to sue137 and scienter.138 Such limitations, however, only es-
tablish the elements of the cause of action; they do not indicate that the
section 10(b) action is less worthy of procedural protection. 139
Justice White did not explain why a right of action "not so different
from the common law action" should not be protected against waiver.
Granted, the cause of action under section 10(b) is not the same as the
"special right" under section 12(2) of the Securities Act, but this is a
distinction without a difference insofar as section 29(a) of the Exchange
Act is concerned. Section 29(a) prohibits waiver of "any provision" of
the Act; it is not limited to "special rights."
The Court recently reaffirmed the principle that the implied cause of
action under section 10(b) is entitled to the same degree of protection as
that afforded an express cause of action under the Securities Act. In
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 140 the Court held that an implied
cause of action under section 10(b) could be maintained for conduct that
also subjects the defendant to liability under section 11 of the Securities
Act. In holding the two causes of action to be cumulative, the Court
reemphasized the validity of the implied right to sue under section
10(b).14 1 Were the right of action under section 10(b) less worthy of
protection than the express right, the Court presumably would not have
allowed the section 10(b) action to stand. At the very least, it would
137. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975).
138. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976).
139. In fact, the procedural protections afforded the private plaintiff who brings a section 10(b)
action are in some ways more extensive than those afforded the private plaintiff claiming under
provisions of the Securities Act that expressly provide private rights of action. The Exchange Act
provides a wider choice of venue than does the Securities Act. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982)
with 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982). Section 1l(e) of the Securities Act authorizes a court to require a
plaintiff to post bond for costs including attorney fees and to assess costs against the plaintiff under
certain circumstances. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1982). A court may not impose such requirements on a
plaintiff in a section 10(b) action. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 209-11 (1976).
Section 13 of the Securities Act imposes a statute of limitations of one year from the time the viola-
tion was or should have been discovered with an absolute limit of three years from the offer or sale of
the security. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1982). The statute of limitations for section 10(b) actions is provided
by the law of the forum state, which usually will provide a longer period than that provided by
section 13. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 210 n.29. For a list of the applicable limitation periods by
state, see 5C A. JACOBS, supra note 132, § 235.02, at 10-21 to -30.
A plaintiff in a Rule lOb-5 action is entitled to a jury trial if damages are requested. See Rachal
v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59, 63 (5th Cir. 1970) (dictum), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971); 5C A. JACOBS,
supra note 132, § 297. Arbitration, of course, requires the plaintiff to forfeit his right to a jury trial.
Note, supra note 32, at 255 & n.85.
140. 459 U.S. 375, 382-83 (1983).
141. Id. at 380. Cf Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir. 1986)
("The express lesson drawn by the Supreme Court is that the 1933 and 1934 Acts are interrelated
components of the federal securities regulation scheme.").
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have discussed why it would allow the implied right to stand in addition
to the express right.
In addition to relying on Justice White's concurrence, courts finding
claims arising under the Exchange Act to be arbitrable have cited the
strong federal policy supporting arbitration.142 Certainly, the federal
policy favoring arbitration should not be overlooked or disparaged. As
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 143 specifies, fed-
eral courts are to uphold the mandates of the Federal Arbitration Act
and order arbitration in the absence of countervailing federal policies.
When the Securities Act or the Exchange Act is implicated, however,
there is a countervailing federal policy opposing arbitration-the policy
of protecting investors by allowing them to vindicate their rights in fed-
eral court. 144 The Exchange Act's underlying policy of protecting inves-
tors is significant. Section 29(a), the nonwaiver provision, effectuates this
purpose. Given the fact that arbitration may often prove a less effective
forum than federal court for the vindication of investors' rights, 145 inves-
tors should have the opportunity to bring their claims in federal court. 146
142. See, eg., Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393, 1395, 1398
(8th Cir. 1986); Brener v. Becker Paribas, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
143. 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3354-55 (1985).
144. Just as a central purpose of the Securities Act is protection of investors, see supra notes 41-
42 and accompanying text, so is investor protection a primary purpose of the Exchange Act. See
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 10-11 (1934) ("To insure to the multitude of investors
the maintenance of fair and honest markets, manipulative practices of all kinds on national ex-
changes are banned."); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1934) ("[The bill [is] to provide
for the regulation of securities exchanges and of over-the-counter markets-to prevent inequitable
and unfair practices on such exchanges and markets, and for other purposes.... ."). See also Tcher-
epnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (protection of investors is "one of [the] central purposes"
of the Exchange Act); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 858 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969) (dominant purposes of Exchange Act are to protect investors and to promote
free and open public securities markets); 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 132, § 6.06, at 1-187 (The [Securi-
ties] and [Exchange] Acts are intended to protect investors."). Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), grants authority to the SEC to prescribe rules and regulations "necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
One might argue on policy grounds that section 10(b) actions should be arbitrated because
litigation is not well-suited to resolving 10(b) actions efficiently. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-43 (1975) (litigation under Rule lob-5 presents undue danger of
vexatiousness because meritless complaints that are not dismissed by summary judgment often have
high settlement value). Yet this is a decision for Congress to make; courts should abstain from
making such a legislative decision. At the very least, courts should be more explicit in setting forth
the policy bases for their decisions.
145. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
146. Despite the potential that arbitration may not protect investors' rights effectively, some
investors may prefer to arbitrate their claims because arbitration is a quick, efficient, and inexpensive
means of dispute resolution. See Note, supra note 32, at 255. If Wilko were applied with equal force
to the Exchange Act, an investor who desired to submit Exchange Act claims to arbitration could do
so under the exception to the Wilko doctrine permitting the arbitration of existing disputes. See
supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Certiorari has been granted in a recent case holding Exchange Act
claims nonarbitrable. 147 The Supreme Court has thus been called on to
resolve the circuit split that has developed as a result of Justice White's
concurrence in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd. Justice White's argu-
ments in favor of compulsory arbitration of implied Exchange Act claims
are unpersuasive. Close analysis of the text of the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act, and the policies underlying the Acts, indicates that the
Court should hold claims arising under the Exchange Act to be nonarbi-
trable.
David L. Heinemann
147. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 55
U.S.L.W. 3197 (Oct. 6, 1986) (No. 86-44).
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